Abstract--In this paper, we present a specification and verification method for preventing denial of service in absence of failures and of integrity violations. We introduce the notion of "user agreements" and argue that lack of specifications for these arguments and for simultaneity conditions makes it impossible to demonstrate denial-of-service prevention, in spite of demonstrably fair service access. We illustrate the use of this method with an example and explain why current methods for specification and verification of safety and liveness properties of concurrent programs do not handle this problem. The proposed specification and verification method is meant to augment current methods for secure system design.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N previous work we have explained and illustrated the relationship between the denial-of-service problem and those of unauthorized disclosure and modification of information [3] . In particular, we have shown that denial of service can take place in absence of any type of system failure or integrity violation. In this paper, we argue that denial of service includes both safety and liveness properties of shared services in a distinct and heretofore unexplored manner.
To verify the absence of denial of service, a servicespecification model is introduced. A key component of that model is the separation of the service-sharing mechanism from the service-sharing policy. The need for specifying fairness and simultaneity conditions formally within the sharing policy is discussed. We argue that, in contrast with other properties, the prevention of denial of service requires specifications of service use; i.e., user agreements, which are external constraints on service invocations that must be obeyed by all service users. In general, these constraints cannot be converted into internal service-enforced constraints, such as those of the servicesharing mechanisms and policies. We show that the specification of sharing policy and that of user agreements form the basis for proof of denial-of-service prevention. We also explain why previous methods developed for verification of liveness and safety properties of concurrent programs cannot be used directly to demonstrate absence of denial of service in shared services. Throughout this paper we assume that the definition of the denial of service is that presented in [l] - [3] .
That is, a group of otherwise-authorized users of a specific service is said to deny service to another group of otherwise-authorized users if the former group makes the specified service unavailable to the latter group for a period of time that exceeds the intended (and advertised) waiting time. The notion of the service user is synonymous with that of a process that invokes the service through the service interface. The service waiting time can be specified explicitly through a maximum waiting time, as in the case of real-time service specifications, or implicitly by stating that any user will be granted access to the service eventually; i.e., in finite time. The latter waiting time specification is the one assumed throughout this paper. The conditions that specify the finite waiting time for a service define the finite waiting time (FWT) policy.
In this paper, we do not address denial-of-service problems that arise from failures of function or performance which might take place in the underlying mechanisms supporting a service implementation (e.g., communication delays, congestion, link failures, etc.). Nor do we address denial-of-service problems caused by integrity violations (e.g., unauthorized deletion or destruction of services and service objects). These problems are addressed by fault tolerance, performance, and access control models. Instead, we present a specification and verification method for preventing denial of service in absence of failures and of integrity violations. We argue that lack of specifications for user agreements and for simultaneity conditions makes it impossible to demonstrate denial-ofservice prevention, in spite of demonstrably fair service access.
This paper consists of five sections and two Appendixes. In Section II we explain the relationship between the denial-of-service problem and the safety and liveness properties of shared services. In Section III we present the specification and verification method and its underlying model. In Section IV we illustrate the method with an example of specification and verification of shared services. (Other examples, which include specification and verification of shared distributed services and proofs of 0098-5589/90/0600-0581$01 . OO 0 1990 IEEE   IEEE   TRANSACTIONS  ON SOFTWARE  ENGINEERING,  VOL. 16, NO. 6. JUNE IYYO denial-of-service prevention in Ada source code, are presented in [ 131.) Section V concludes this paper. Appendix A defines the temporal logic operators used in this paper, and Appendix B lists some useful temporal logic theorems.
II. DENIAL OF SERVICE VERSUS SAFETY AND LIVENESS

PROBLEMS
Various safety and Ziveness properties of shared services or program modules have been widely used in the specification and verification of concurrent programs [9] , [lo] , [ 121, and of communication protocols in computer networks [6] . These properties can also be used to verify that some denial-of-service problems have been eliminated from shared services. However, flawed specifications of concurrency control mechanisms and/or policies are not the only source of denial of service [l] . Also, safety and liveness problems that are unrelated to service sharing become irrelevant to denial of service.
A. Denial of Service as a SafetylLiveness Problem
Denial of service can be both a safety and a liveness problem. It takes place whenever one or both of the following situations occur: 1) some users prevent other users from making progress within the service for an arbitrarily long time; 2) some users cause other users to receive incorrect service by preventing the service from satisfying its intended functional specifications for the latter users, and thus the service is disabled in an unauthorized way. Denial-of-service instances of situation 1) are liveness problems, whereas denial-of-service instances of situation 2) are safety problems.
A user is said to make progress within a service if all of its service invocations will eventually terminate. Intuitively, a service allows its users to make progress whenever its sharing policies are fair, whenever it is free from deadlock, and whenever it is free from starvation. Fairness and freedom from starvation are liveness concerns. Furthermore, a service performs correctly whenever the different user operations within the service neither interfere with each other nor disable the service, and whenever the effects of a user operation within the service persist after the operation is committed by its user. All of these properties are safety concerns.
B. Denial of Service as a Distinct Safety/Liveness Problem
The major safety properties that have been formally specified and verified in the concurrent programming area area: mutual exclusion, resource invariance, and deadlock freedom. The major Ziveness properties that have been formally specified and verified in a general way are termination and fairness. Starvation freedom is also a liveness property that has been verified formally in some examples. These safety and liveness properties are the fundamental properties of concurrency control mechanisms within shared services. Since services may be invoked concurrently, these properties must be used to prevent denial-of-service problems.
However, denial-of-service problems can also be caused by some other sharing problems unrelated to safety or liveness. Failure to use either adequate service-sharing mechanisms, such as resource quotas, or service-sharing policies, such as the finite waiting time for individual users, can also cause denial of service. For example, inadequate enforcement of resource quotas may stop the activity of the service [ 11, [2] ; lack of finite-waiting-time specification may cause denial of service to some users even if a fair scheduling policy is enforced within the service [13] .
One of the reasons why denial of service differs from the typical safety/liveness problems is that it may result from the inadequate use of the service. Undesirable user behavior can cause some users to receive incorrect service or prevent other users from making progress within the service. For example, the service behavior may depend on the order of entry operations invoked by users. Whenever a service assumes a certain invocation order and the assumed order is not guaranteed, then denial of service may take place. For example, a resource allocation service may expect a user to release resources some time after the resources have been acquired. However, a malicious user can monopolize the resources without releasing them for an arbitrarily long time. This user can thus deny the resources to other users. These types of denial of service may occur because shared services have no control over the users' behavior outside the service. Although some aspects of the users' behavior can be checked by other system facilities outside the service (e.g., through compilation checks), a resource can become unavailable for an arbitrarily long time when a user holding the resource gets blocked within another service; or when a user aborts before normal service termination and some of the service operations cannot finish their work on behalf of other users.
Notice that current service models, such as those based on monitors [8] and resource controllers [ 121, which are normally used for synchronization, are unable to protect against the denial-of-service problems caused by undesirable user behavior. This is because, although current service models can always schedule the proper order of operations among different users, they cannot always control the invocation order of individual users. Current servicespecification models focus on the integration of concurrency control into program modules of services and thus are irrelevant to the user behavior outside the service.
III. FORMAL SPECIFICATION AND VERIFICATION
METHOD
In this section we introduce a specification and verification method that is suitable for the prevention of denial of service in shared services. We introduce the notion of "user agreement" and present a model for service and user-agreement specification. We argue that the specifi-cation of fairness properties is insufficient to prevent denial of service, and that the specification of simultaneity conditions and user agreements are also necessary. Together these three specifications define the FWT policy.
A. The Notion of User Agreement
Denial of service can take place not only by exploiting flawed sharing mechanisms and/or policies within a service but also by undesired sequences of service invocation outside the service. Therefore, the allowed service-invocation sequences must be specified as constraints outside the serivce. Since these constraints include invocation sequences of multiple service users, they are called the "user agreements. " User agreements for service access must be specified outside the service specification for two reasons. First, user agreements must eliminate the undesirable interuser dependencies created by user misbehavior outside the service. ' Second, user agreements may refer to multiple services, and therefore cannot be included in any single service specification. For example, Havender's "ordered resource acquisition" approach to deadlock prevention [7] is an example of a user agreement that spans multiple resource-providing services inside an operating system.
The specification of user agreements outside a service does not necessarily mean that service users are trusted to obey them. Whenever compile-time checks on user code are impractical, the user agreements can be enforced by code outside the service that is executed before the service calls are actually issued. An example of such code in other areas, such as in the deadlock avoidance area, is that which determines whether a resource assignment to a user is safe [4] .
To define user agreements for shared services, we have to analyze all possible invocation sequences that may be issued by each user and all possible invocation sequences that may invoke the shared service. For convenience, the former sequence is called the U seq and the latter is called the S-seq. Let Ui seq be a partial order of service invocations issued by-an individual user Ui. Let S-seq be a partial order of concurrent service invocations by many users. Thus, S-seq is an invocation sequence that interleaves operations of individual Uj seq, and it preserves the original partial order of each Vi seq. Analysis of U-seq and S-seq allows us to define th% user agreements for shared services.
1) Safe Service-Invocation Sequence: Operations needed for controlled service sharing can be classified into two categories: a) the resource-consuming operations and b) the resource-producing operations. For example, the Acquire and Release operations of resource allocators can be considered to be the consuming and producing operations, respectively. Similarly, the Put and Get operations of a bounded-buffer service are the consuming and pro-'Other undesirable interuser dependencies, which can also be countered by user agreements, are those created by inadequate sharing mechanisms and policies [ 11. ducing operations, respectively (if buffer spaces are considered to be service-provided resources). Some services, such as the resource allocators, require their users to produce resources that have been previously consumed by the same users. Other services, such as the bounded-buffer services, allow resources to be consumed and produced by different users. Therefore, we have to define the allowed types of operations and the allowed orders of operations for each user. Let ai be the allowed consuming operation invoked by user Vi, and bi be the allowed operation that attempts to produce the resources consumed by user Ui. (Note that bi is not necessarily invoked by Ui .) The set of allowed operations for 17; can be defined as Op; set = ( op ) op E Ai or op E B; } where Ai represents the setof all allowed ai, and Bi represents the set of all allowed bjl, b;z, * * * that produces resources consumed by users Uj, 3 Uj2, * * * , respectively. For resource allocators, the set of allowed operations is Opi set = { Acquirei, Releasei }, and each user Vi is allowed to invoke both operations. For bounded-buffer services, there are two types of users, viz. senders and receivers. The set of allowed operations for the sender Vi is Opi set = { Puti } , -and for the receiver Uj is Opj-set = { Geti } , where Ui is the peer sender of the receiver Uj.
The allowed invocation order between two operations can be defined by the partial order relation " I ". The order relation specifies that an invocation of operation op, that must precede an invocation of operation op2 is represented as op, < op2. Given the set of all allowed operations of user Vi (i.e., Op; set), the set of all allowed invocation orders between -every two operations in Opi set is represented as Or; set. For resource allocators (viz, example presented in S:ction IV below), resources that can be relinquished by user Ui must be those which are previously acquired; thus for Ui, Ori set = { (Acquirei < Releasei) } . For bounded-buffer s&vices, no ordering constraints exist for their users because the senders may only invoke Put operations, whereas the receivers may only invoke Get operations. Thus, for each user Vi, Ori set = { } (an empty set). To define safe user-invocati& sequences, we use the following notation. Given (opl < 0~2) E Ori set l Ui( k) is partial sequence of Vi seq up to, and in--eluding, Ui (k). Given Opi set and Ori set, the safe user-invocation sequence for Uy can be defined as follows.
Dejnition: A user-invocation sequence U, seq of a specific service is said to be safe if it satisfies the following conditions: st?,thenn,,(k) 1 niP2(k)for -For example, suppose that the producing operation b of a resource allocator produces an amount of resources equal to that consumed by the consuming operation a. Then the sequence Vi seq denoted by Ui = ai, bi, ai, ai, bi is safe.
-
16, NO. 6. JUNE 1990 In this Ui seq, some resources allocated to user Ui are not relinquished before Ui terminates execution (i.e., there are more ai's than b,'S). However, user Ui neither relinquishes resources before it acquires them, nor does it relinquish resources allocated to other users. Therefore, the user-invocation sequence is safe in the sense that it will not cause resource inconsistencies. For the same resource allocator, the sequences of Ui seqs denoted by Ui = ai, bi, ai, bj, and Ui = ai, bi, bi,-ai are not safe. The first Ui seq is not safe because user Ui attempts to relinquish one of the resources allocated to user Uj. The second Ui seq is not safe because user U, attempts to relinquish its-allocated resource twice. Both of these two Ui seqs -may cause resource inconsistencies.
2) Live Service-Invocation Sequence: Let CY be a possible S-seq of a specific service. The elements of (Y are service operations invoked by all users. The order of operations in cy is the real-time order of all service invocations. If ai and bi represent the consuming and producing operations respectively as defined above, then the sequence (Y = al, a2, a;, b,, a4, a;, b2, b5, b3, . * * is a possible S-seq. Here a* represents a consuming operation of user Ui that is blocked within the service waiting for certain service conditions to become true. Service conditions are boolean functions of service states such as the resource state. The service conditions may change value only through invocations of the service-entry operations. For example, in the invocation sequence given above, the operation a5, invoked by user U,, is blocked waiting for some resources to become available. After the resource consumed by user U2 is relinquished, U, resumes its operation (since operation b2 is immediately followed by operation b5, and b5 can appear in the S-seq only after a5 resumes). For convenience, we use the following notation: l p*i (c) is an operation pi that is blocked for condition c; l pi(c) is an operation pi that resumes execution after being blocked for condition c.
When condition c becomes true, p"(c) might not become pi(c) immediately due to the resumption of other blocked invocations that are waiting for the same condition c. However, a condition may become true several times during the evolution of a specific S-seq. Given condition c for operation pi, let a0 be the subsequence of a S-seq CY from the beginning of cx to the blocked operation p"(c).
Suppose that aj represents the subsequence of Q! between ( j -1 )th to jth time that condition c becomes true after p,? (c). Then for operation pi and the sequence Q! = (Ye, aI, * * * , ~j, * * * , we use the notation p*(c) 2 pi(c) to represent an invocation pi that is blocked at the end of a0 and that resumes operation at the end of ~j.
Dejinition: A service-invocation sequence S-seq is said to be live if for every blocked invocation p,? (c) there exists a set of subsequences cyo, CY,, * . ;, , CY~, and (Y = (Ye, (~1, * . * , ~j, * * * , such thatp,y(c) + pi(c). is not a live S-seq. This sequence has a: (c) y ak (c) for all k L ,3. However, for a;(c), no ~j exists in (Y such that a;(c) 2 a2 (c). Thus, operation a2 is blocked forever.
3) Analysis of User and Service Invocation Sequences: To obtain appropriate specifications for user agreements of a specific service, the analysis of both U-seq and S-seq is required. Analysis that is limited to U-seq is insufficient because U-seq provides only information about what users are allowed to do, but not what users must do. Furthermore, analysis that is limited to S-seq is also insufficient because liveness of a serviceinvocation sequence is meaningless without knowing that all completed operations in the S-seq have received the intended services. Analysis of U-seqs cannot determine the liveness property of the entire service-invocation sequence for at least two reasons. First, resources consumed by a user may not necessarily be produced later by the same user. For example, users that do a P operation on a certain semaphore may not do a I' operation on the same semaphore, and vice versa. Thus, the availability of the resources protected by the semaphore cannot be determined by each individual U-seq. Second, users may stop execution in the middle of their S-seqs, and thus some operations, which other users may invoke, cannot finish their work on behalf of their users. For example, users' invocations may deadlock each other in several services. The occurrence of such deadlocks cannot be predicted by analyzing U-seqs separately. Construction of user agreements based on live S seqs solves the two problems described above.
Analysis of S-seqs helps establish liveness properties that cannot be provided by U seqs. However, a live S seq does not guarantee that each individual operation rec&es its intended service. An invocation may return abnormally repeatedly (e.g., an exception is signaled before normal return), or may return normally with incorrect results whenever sharing control is incorrectly specified. Therefore, the analysis of both U-seq and S-seq is required to determine appropriate user agreements of shared services. Of course, the appropriate U-seq and S:seq depend on the sharing mechanisms and policies within the service under consideration.
B. The Specification Model for Shared Services
The service-specification model includes two major parts: the service specifications and the user-agreement specifications. The service specifications describe all the desired operations and properties that must be provided by the shared service. The user-agreement specifications describe all the desired properties that must be provided by the users of the shared service.
Given a specific service, the existence of undesirable interuser dependencies (and thus the potential for denial of service [ l] - [3] ) is determined by three major concerns: l the service-sharing mechanisms and policies; l the user-invocation sequence; l the service-invocation sequence. Appropriate internal service specifications are intended to eliminate undesirable interuser dependencies that may result from the first concern. Appropriate user-agreement specifications are used to eliminate undesirable interuser dependencies that may result from the second and the third concerns. The service-specification model separates sharing mechanisms from policy specifications because it distinguishes different types of service properties (i.e., safety versus liveness properties). We adopt a temporal-logicbased specification language [lo] , [ 1 l] to facilitate expressing the semantics of sharing mechanisms and sharing policies within a service and the user agreements for this service. (The semantics of temporal logic are reviewed in Appendix A.) We choose a specification method based on temporal logic to facilitate the construction of a service model for two reasons: 1) it has the power of reasoning about "future" events and thus is particularly suitable for expressing our notion of progress, and 2) it is convenient for expressing the semantics of the invocation order, and this order relation is an important part of our service model. However, other specification languages, not necessarily based on temporal logic, could be used with our specification method.
In the remainder of this section we explain how a specification that guarantees finite waiting for a service is written. We also explain the rationale for, and the specification of, the finite waiting time (FWT) policy. Then we introduce a specification for shared services that can be invoked concurrently and a specification of user agreements that describes properties for safe user-invocation sequences and live service-invocation sequences. Finally, the relationship between different specifications that constitute the FWT policy is presented. We also discuss their progress implications. 1) SpeciJication of the FWT Policy: Access to shared services must be guaranteed to authorized users. Thus, an FWT policy must be adopted in the service to guarantee individual user progress within a shared service. For the purposes of this paper, the FWT policy consists of three different, yet mutually related specifications: fairness policies, simultaneity policies, and user agreements. The notion of the user agreement has been introduced earlier in this paper. The fairness and simultaneity policies are sharing policies specified within a service. The semantics of the fairness and simultaneity policies are presented in the next subsection, which also introduces the specification of shared services. Informally, the fairness policy states that a user will not get blocked forever within a service if that user has many opportunities to make progress. The simultaneity policy states that a user will eventually have all the opportunities needed to make progress within a service provided that the user agreements of that service can be satisfied.
Whenever a specification implies individual user progress within a service, then the FWT policy for that service is guaranteed. Thus, if the user agreements for that service can be satisfied, then the simultaneity policies guarantee the existence of progress opportunities for each user, and the fairness policies, in turn, guarantee that each user makes progress. The user agreements of a service can be satisfied in one or both of the following two ways depending on the service environment: l apply service-invocation constraints to all service users so that all users obey the user agreements, and l enforce user agreements so that the sequences of user invocations are regulated before the actual calls are issued.
Therefore, the fairness policy and the simultaneity' policy plus the user agreements imply the FWT policy. Conversely, if any one of the specifications of fairness and simultaneity policies as well as the user agreements is not provided, then either the progress opportunities for some users may not always exist or the service may treat some users unfairly. Thus, the enforcement of the FWT policy cannot be guaranteed.
A FWT policy is best specified by using, whenever possible, internal service specifications; i.e., sharing-policy specifications. However, in general, it is impossible for internal service specifications to guarantee a finite waiting time. This assertion is based on the following line of reasoning. First, a finite waiting time for a service is guaranteed only if the service-invocation sequences of that service are live. However, a service specification cannot include the semantics of "live service-invocation sequences" because it cannot predict the users' behavior outside the service. Thus, we have to specify the properties required for live service-invocation sequences outside the service. Second, if we combined the fairness and the simultaneity policies into a single policy, then the resulting specification would not separate concerns properly and, in general, would become more complex. Such a specification would mix different properties and would become less comprehensible. This would make it difficult to implement the service from such a specification. For example, the fairness policy for users waiting within a service entry queue (e.g., the FIFO policy), and the simultaneity policy (e.g., any policy that prevents individual user starvation) are implemented by different liveness properties. Any specification that combines different, unrelated properties at the same level of abstraction would provide little specific information for practical implementation of any of the properties. For this reason, we decom-
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2) Service Specijication: A service specification defines the properties for concurrent service access and the necessary mechanisms and policies to enforce the desired properties. The skeleton of a service specification is shown in Fig. 1 . Note the separation of the sharing mechanisms and policies. Below, we explain each keyword in Fig. 1 "effects" part describes the normal actions taken by the service when no exceptions occur. The variables within a service may change values after the execution of an interface operation. In order to distinguish the value of a service variable before modification from its value after modification, we add a symbol " ' " to the right of the variable to represent its value after the operation has executed. For example, the "Acquire" operation of the resource allocator can be specified as follows:
interface operations Acquire (#Active = 1) ~-t (#Active = 0) l fairness: The fairness policy expresses the behavior required of a service such that the invocations of an operation which satisfy the necessary conditions infinitely often (i.e., repeatedly) will not be blocked forever. For example, in the resource allocation service, let condition c, denote the statement: "the number of resources currently available is no less than the number of resources requested, ' ' and let condition c2 denote the statement: "there are no active operations in the service at this time." We need the following fairness policy: if both cl and c? can simultaneously become true infinitely often, then the blocked "Acquire" operation will eventually resume execution and finally terminate. This fairness policy can be specified as follows:
fairness (at(Acquire) A 00 ((free I Acquire.n) A (#Active = 0))) -. ufter(Acquire) l simultaneity: The simultaneity policy states that during the waiting period of an invocation, if every condition requested can be satisfied infinitely often, then all conditions eventually will be satisfied simultaneously. For example, let c, and c2 be the conditions used in the description of fairness policy. The simultaneity policy of the resource allocation service can be defined by the following two specifications: 1) whenever an invocation to "Acquire" is blocked, if c, can be satisfied infinitely often and so can c2, then cl and c2 eventually will be satisfied simultaneously;
2) whenever an invocation to "Acquire" is blocked and some users always release their allocated resources repeatedly until c, becomes true, then c, will eventually become true.
In the second part, condition c, is further decomposed into a number of subconditions. Each of these subconditions denotes the statement: "one unit of the requested resource becomes available. " We specify the simultaneity policy as follows: vice-invocation sequence that must be obeyed by users outside the service. For example, to guarantee that all users of a resource allocator eventually make progress, the service-invocation sequences must preserve the liveness property: whenever an "Acquire" operation gets blocked waiting for some resources to become available, then a sufficient number of "Release" operations must eventually become active and finally terminate until sufficient free resource units become available. Thus, the waiting "Acquire" operation would get a chance to make progress. This user agreement can be specified as:
The user agreement is provided in an abstract form in the service-specification model and is valid for all services of the same class. However, the implementation of user agreements is strongly dependent on the service environment and thus may differ from service to service. To guarantee that a service-invocation sequence is live, users that share multiple classes of resource allocation services may be restricted to use only some allowed operation orders, viz. the "ordered resource" approach to deadlock prevention [7] . Alternatively, service users can be asked to claim the largest number of resource units of each service that the user will need at one time before any service access; viz. the "resource claim" approach to deadlock avoidance [4] .
C. Progress Implications of Fairness, Simultaneity, and User Agreements
Informally, a fairness policy states that a user will make progress if it has many opportunities to make progress. A fairness policy is necessary to allow individual progress. Without a fairness policy, an invocation may be blocked forever in a service, even if it has many opportunities to make progress. To illustrate the notion of fairness, let us consider the first-in-first-out (FIFO) scheduling policy. Is FIFO a fair policy? First, if one defines FIFO according to the overall arriving order of service invocations, then FIFO is clearly not a fair policy. For example, some invocations of the "Release" operation of a resource allocator may be blocked forever just because they arrived after a call to "Acquire" that requested a number of resources which exceed that of the currently available resources. Thus, invocations of "Release" are treated unfairly. Second, if one defines FIFO based on invocations of individual interface operations, then FIFO guarantees fairness only for invocations of the same interface operation. It would not guarantee fairness between different interface operations. An important question is whether a fairness policy guarantees an individual user's progress. Fairness does not necessarily imply an individual user's progress because the opportunities for making progress may not always exist. Progress opportunities can only be provided by the application of simultaneity policies. Informally, a simultaneity policy states that a user will eventually have all the opportunities it needs to make progress if user agreements allow these opportunities to occur. However, a fairness policy together with a simultaneity policy still cannot guarantee an individual user's progress because the existence of such opportunities always depends on user agreements.
To illustrate the necessity for user agreements, let us consider the specification of a fairness policy. The conditions required for progress within a service are expressed as the hypothesis of the fairness policy. Some of these conditions can be satisfied only when the serviceinvocation sequence is live. Thus, in addition to specific sharing policies, some form of user-agreement specification is always required.
One may ask: if user agreements allow progress opportunities to be created, do we still need the simultaneity policy? A simultaneity policy is required because, although user agreements can allow progress opportunities to be created, they may not be able to guarantee that progress takes place within a service for at least two reasons. First, the occurrence of progress opportunities may also depend on other conditions that can be satisfied only by sharing mechanisms and policies of the service itself. For example, a service may require mutual exclusion among concurrent invocations. An operation invocation has an opportunity to make progress only when the currently active operation terminates. Termination would depend, in this case, upon the mutual exclusion conditions enforced within the service. Thus, the satisfaction of these conditions cannot be determined by the users outside the service. Second, even if the individual conditions requested are all dependent on user agreements, they may not be satisfied simultaneously. This is because other invocations, which are required to satisfy only part of these conditions, can make progress repeatedly. Thus, individual conditions requested by certain users may never become true simultaneously.
The service invocations of these users will be blocked forever.
From the above discussion, it should be clear that the fairness policy, the simultaneity policy, and the user agreements are all required to guarantee individual progress.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE FORMAL SPECIFICATION AND
VERIFICATION
METHOD
In this section we apply the model of shared service to specify a general resource allocator. The choice of this generic example is motivated by the fact that allocators provide a common source of denial-of-service problems in operating systems and communication protocols (failures and integrity violations notwithstanding).
Further specification and verification examples, including distributed services such as network access, are presented in [ 131. To demonstrate that the service model is appropriate for the prevention of denial of service, we will verify that all users of the given resource allocator eventually make progress and receive intended service.
A. Specification of a Resource Allocator
A resource allocator consists of a pool of resource units that can be shared by a group of users. Initially, the pool contains the total number of resource units. To prevent resource monopolization, the resource allocator maintains a resource quota for each user. The resource quota provides the maximum number of resource units that can be assigned to each user. The resource allocator also maintains a variable array "own" that specifies the number of resource units currently assigned to each user. Each user can acquire "n" units of the resource by invoking the "Acquire" operation. Similarly, each user can relinquish "n" units of the resource by invoking the "Release" operation. Based on the model of shared services, the service and agreement specifications of the resource allocator are shown in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively. 
B. Formal Verijication of the Resource Allocator
A resource allocator guarantees resource allocation to each user if all user invocations, which do not cause exceptions, eventually terminate and receive their intended service. We begin by proving that the specifications of the resource allocator guarantee that user invocations eventually make progress. We then show that the specifications ensure correct service for individual users. In the following proofs, we assume that user operations do not cause exceptions.
I) Progress Proofs: The term "invocations of resource allocator eventually terminate" can be expressed by the following two temporal formulas:
at( Acquire) + after (Acquire) ; (Pl) at (Release) -+ ufer( Release) .
(P2)
We must prove that given the service and user-agreement specifications of the resource allocator, both (Pl) and (P2) are temporal theorems. To do this, we prove a series of lemmas based on the service and user-agreement specifications. To prove that (P2) is a temporal theorem, we first show that the resource allocator is repeatedly in a state in which no operations are in execution (Lemma 1). To prove that (Pl) is a temporal theorem, first we show that a blocked "Acquire" invocation will eventually get a chance to proceed (Lemma 2). Then we show that if an "Acquire" invocation can be blocked forever, it should have an infinite number of chances to proceed (Lemma 3). Finally, we show that if (Pl) is not true, then eventually the invocation of "Acquire" will be blocked for- Proof: Applying Lemma 1 to the second fairness policy of the resource allocator (viz. Fig. 3) , we complete the proof immediately.
Lemma 2: The formula in (Acquire) -W (free 2 Acquire. n ) is a temporal theorem.
Proof From the user-agreement specification of the resource allocator (viz. Fig. 4 ) and the temporal axiom From the temporal formulas (L3), (L4), and the derived theorem (D2) in Appendix B, we can conclude that 0 0 in (Acquire) * q V((free 2 Acqz4ire.n)
A (#Active = 0)).
Lemma 4: If the temporal formula 0 (at( Acquire) A 0 ( 1 (after (Acquire) ) ) ) is true, then the temporal formula 0 0 (in (Acquire) ) is also true.
Proof From the semantics of the control predicates at, after, and in given in Appendix A, we have V(at(Acquire)
A 0 ( 1 (after(Acquire)))) * V(at(Acquire) A V(in(Acquire))) * VU(in(Acquire)).
Theorem 2: The formula at (Acquire) * ufter( Acquire) is a temporal theorem.
Proof: Suppose that the formula is not a temporal theorem. Then O(at(Acquire) A 0 (1 (after(Acquire)))).
From Lemmas 3 and 4 we obtain 0 0 ((free I Acquire.n) A ( #Active = 0)).
From the first fairness policy of the resource allocator (viz. Fig. 3 ) and this temporal formula we obtain at (Acquire) -+ after (Acquire) which is supposed to be false. This completes the proof.
2) Service Correctness Proofs: To demonstrate that user invocations receive correct service when they terminate, we show that the following temporal formulas are temporal theorems.
The proofs are rather straightforward and can be obtained by using the specification of sharing mechanisms.
Theorem 3: The temporal formulas (Cl), (C2), and (C3) are theorems.
Proof First, from the concurrency constraints of the resource allocator (viz. Fig. 3 ), concurrent invocations are required to be mutually exclusive. Thus, if V(after(Acquire(n))), then the "effects" part of "Acquire" operation implies (Cl) directly. Similarly, the "effects" part of "Release" operation implies (C2) directly.
Second, applying the temporal axiom (P UNTIL Q ) * ( 0 1 Q = 0 P ), (C3) is directly implied by the fourth resource constraint (viz. Fig. 3 ).
V. DISCUSSION We have presented here a service model for the prevention of denial of service in computer systems. Based on this model we specified shared services using temporal logic. The advantage of using this model and specifications method to solve safety and liveness problems which cause denial of service is that essential service properties are stated based on the concept of abstraction. The service model allows us to interpret, specify, and verify service properties for preventing denial of service in different service environments. This is more important than it might appear because denial of service usually appears in multiple guises in practice [l] .
Other research work also used abstract specification methods to describe required properties [5] , [9] , [ 121. However, these methods are not particularly suitable for the prevention of denial-of-service problems for the following reasons. First, they do not provide specifications of simultaneity policy within the service. (Although in principle these methods could provide simultaneity-policy specifications, they currently do not include such specifications.) Second, they do not specify properties that must be satisfied by the users outside the service. (Instead, such properties usually appear as hypotheses of fairness policies specified within a service. However, user behavior outside the service may make these hypotheses false. Therefore, external service specifications are still necessary.)
To date, only the fairness policy has been specified and verified in a general way. However, the fairness policy cannot prevent denial-of-service instances caused by conspiracy among a group of users that manage to monopolize shared resources. Our service specification and verification method provides a formal semantics of simultaneity policies that are applicable to all shared services. Simultaneity policies are necessary but are not sufficient to guarantee individual user progress within a service.
The main reason that the current specification methods are unsatisfactory is that they only attempt to express the properties that must be enforced within a service. Useragreement specifications, which are necessary to eliminate the effects of undesirable interuser dependencies within the service, are usually not provided. In this case, the denial-of-service problems cannot be solved by the direct application of current specification methods. In general, a temporal logic formula is constructed from a set of predicates, the usual logic operators, and the temporal operators 0, 0, and UNTIL. A predicate is a boolean function of a computation state. The unary operator 0 is pronounced "henceforth. " If P is a predicate, the formula 0 P means "P is true now and will remain true for all future states in the computation. " The unary operator V is pronounced "eventually. " The formula VP means "P is true now or will become true sometime in the Hence, if control is currently at the entry point to "op" and never reaches the exit point thereafter, then control will remain in "op" forever; i.e., (at(op) A 0 1 ufter(op)) * min(op).
Another useful temporal formula, which states that a property P always causes another property Q to become true subsequently, can be expressed by P e Q = q (P * VQ).
The combination of these two unary temporal operators is also useful. For example, to express that a property P is satisfied "injinitely often, " we can use the formula 0 0 P (infinitely often P ). The q 0 operator is especially useful for expressing the fairness property within a service whenever concurrent access is allowed.
The binary temporal operator UNTIL is used to express relationships between two points in a computation (i.e., to express an ordering property). The formula P UNTIL Q means "P is true for all states until the first state where Q is true;" i.e., P UNTIL Q = P remains true until Q becomes true. This Appendix presents the syntax of temporal formulas and derives a list of temporal theorems that are used in this paper. Some portions of this Appendix have been taken from Hailpem's report [5] .
A. The Syntax of Temporal Formulas
A description of a temporal logic system includes four parts: a list of atomic predicates; a set of formation rules that define which predicates (expressed in terms of the atomic predicates) are (well-formed) formulas; a set of distinguished formulas, known as axioms; and a set of inference rules that permit operations on axioms and on those formulas that have been derived from previous applications of the inference rules. The formulas obtained by applications of inference rules are known as theorems. If formula P is an axiom or a theorem, then we write t-P. The syntax of temporal formulas is based on the following rules and axioms. 2) Other Derived Theorems: The theorems listed below are used in Section IV of this paper. Each theorem is followed by its proof. 
((P * Q) A (<PA Q) * R)) =
